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Abstract 
This is a reply to a critique by Botha and Govindjee (2017 PELJ 
1-32) of our interpretation of the hate speech provisions of the 
Equality Act (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair
Discrimination Act 4 of 2000) in Marais and Pretorius (2015 
PELJ 901-942), in which we considered the constitutionality of 
section 10(1) of the Act, amongst other things. We address
Botha and Govindjees' rejection of our view that hate speech is 
a form of unfair discrimination and that the most appropriate 
constitutional framework within which section 10(1) should be 
interpreted and assessed is sections 9 and 10 of the 
Constitution. We consider Botha and Govindjees' rejection of 
this point of departure, their opposing different interpretation of 
the role of the proviso in section 12 of the Act and, generally, 
their reasons for concluding that section 10(1) is 
unconstitutional. We maintain that Botha and Govindjee's 
proposals for reform unduly restrict the hate speech prohibition 
to cover exclusively expression that warrants criminalisation. In 
doing so, they fail to fully acknowledge the transformative
obligation in terms of international law, the Constitution and the
Equality Act, to prohibit and prevent unfair discrimination.
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1 Introduction 
Hate speech remains an important and contentious issue in South Africa 
and elsewhere. It is important because hate speech directly implicates the 
foundational values of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
(the Constitution). It is contentious because the regulation of hate speech 
has to reconcile deep tensions in relation to human dignity in the sense of 
autonomy and as a right to be respected by others, in relation to freedom of 
expression as a contributor to the realisation of equality and also as 
potentially instrumental to its violation, and in relation to freedom of 
expression as both an essential ingredient of, as well as a potential threat 
to deliberative democracy. Hate speech regulation therefore requires a 
constitutional framework conducive to a cautious and proportional 
evaluation of the worth of the censured expression and the importance of 
the aims of its prohibition. 
This contribution is a reply to a response by Botha and Govindjee1 to an 
article in which we sought to place the hate speech provisions of the 
Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 
(the Equality Act) in such a constitutional framework.2 There are 
fundamental differences in our respective approaches to the interpretation 
and constitutionality of the prohibition of hate speech in section 10(1) of the 
Equality Act. The main points of difference concern the relationship between 
the prohibition of unfair discrimination and the regulation of hate speech, the 
constitutionality of section 10(1) and the proviso of section 12, as well as 
Botha and Govindjee's proposals for the reform of section 10(1). 
Botha and Govindjee do not view section 10(1) as primarily prohibiting a 
form of unfair discrimination. They submit that compared with section 
16(2)(c) of the Constitution, the hate speech prohibition is vague, imprecise 
and over-reaching. In their view section 10(1) "creates a measure which is 
neither a reasonable and justifiable limitation to the freedom of expression 
(as tested in terms of section 36 of the Constitution), nor a clear, necessary 
                                            
*  Maria E (Marelize) Marais. LLB (Stell) LLM (UFS) LLD (UFS). Research fellow, Free 
State Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State, South Africa. E-mail: 
maraisme@ufs.ac.za. This is a reply to a critique by Botha and Govindjee Botha and 
Govindjee 2017 PELJ 1-32. Also see Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 901-942, 
which is the original contribution. 
**  Jan L (Loot) Pretorius. BCom LLB BA Hons LLD (UFS). Professor, Free State Centre 
for Human Rights, University of the Free State, South Africa. E-mail: 
pretorjl@ufs.ac.za. 
1  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 1-32. 
2  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 901-942. 
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or proportional restriction thereto".3 They propose an amendment that would 
substantially narrow the scope of section 10(1).4 We, on the other hand, 
consider the constitutional right to equality and non-discrimination as the 
primary context for interpreting the Equality Act's hate speech provisions. 
This approach, in our view, provides a more coherent interpretive basis to 
address the constitutional concerns raised by Botha and Govindjee. 
In this reply we test our views and arguments against those presented by 
the authors. We maintain the correctness of our approach as set out in our 
original article, which we will briefly reiterate here. In line with this approach, 
we argue that narrowing down the section 10(1) prohibition as proposed by 
the authors would unduly negate legitimate and compelling aims of the 
Constitution, the Equality Act and international law.5  
2 The link between unfair discrimination and hate 
speech 
Section 10(1) of the Equality Act reads as follows: 
(1) Subject to the proviso in section 12, no person may publish, propagate, 
advocate or communicate words based on one or more of the 
prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to - 
(a) be hurtful; 
(b) be harmful or to incite harm; 
(c) promote or propagate hatred. 
The proviso in section 12 stipulates: 
Provided that bona fide engagement in artistic creativity, academic and 
scientific inquiry, fair and accurate reporting in the public interest or publication 
of any information, advertisement or notice in accordance with section 16 of 
the Constitution, is not precluded by this section. 
Botha and Govindjee disagree with our contention that the above-
mentioned hate speech provisions of the Equality Act should be seen as 
prohibiting a species of unfair discrimination.6 We argued that section 10 of 
the Act, as an integral part of a legislative instrument explicitly intended to 
realise the constitutional right to equality, should primarily be interpreted in 
the latter context, and not section 16 of the Constitution. We justified this 
                                            
3  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 27. 
4  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 28-29. 
5  See para 2.4. 
6  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9. 
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interpretive framework for section 10, in brief, by referring to the Act's 
primary aim, stated in its preamble, to give effect to section 9 of the 
Constitution, which requires the enactment of national legislation to prevent 
or prohibit unfair discrimination and to promote the achievement of equality. 
The preamble also commits to the facilitation of the transition to a 
democratic society, "united in its diversity, marked by human relations that 
are caring and compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, 
fairness, equity, social progress, justice, human dignity and freedom".7 The 
value of ubuntu, which has become an integral part of our constitutional 
values and principles, should be added.8 
The Equality Court recently stated that 
… the constitutional prohibition on hate speech has in fact been given practical 
legislative effect by the Equality Act. This Act was enacted following s 9(4) of 
the Constitution which provides, as stated before, that national legislation 
must be enacted in order to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination. As such, 
the hate speech, contended for by the Commission here, falls squarely into 
the category of conduct that perpetuates systemic patterns of discrimination, 
and as a direct consequence, the Equality Act aims at prohibiting such 
conduct.9 
In the Court's view it is equally clear from both section 9 of the Constitution 
and the relevant provisions of the Equality Act that "all persons should not 
only (not) be unfairly discriminated against, but should also be provided with 
                                            
7  In Afri-forum v Malema 2011 6 SA 235 (EqC) para 110 it is stated that "(t)he Equality 
Act does not only seek to prohibit conduct. It seeks in the very prohibition to open 
avenues of conciliation; to confer dignity upon all members of society by assisting 
them to find the building blocks necessary to shape their ability to make the 
judgments which will regulate their future conduct. The Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000 (Equality Act) seeks to drive this 
process forward by setting the moral standard to which members of society must 
adhere". S 10 necessarily encompasses the hate speech described in s 16(2)(c) of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution), as well as 
similarly threatening hate speech. Hate speech of this extreme nature might not be 
susceptible to this approach, and might require harsh measures not provided for in 
terms of the Act. Hence s 10(2) of the Act provides for the referral for prosecution of 
hate speech that constitutes criminal offences. 
8  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 380-384 para 2.3. In Afri-forum v Malema 
2011 6 SA 240 (EqC) para 18 the Equality Court listed a number of characteristics 
of ubuntu, including that it "dictates a shift from confrontation to mediation and 
conciliation", "dictates good attitudes and shared concern", "works towards 
sensitising a disputant or a defendant in litigation to the hurtful impact of his actions 
to the other party and towards changing such conduct rather than merely punishing 
the disputant", and "favours civility and civilised dialogue premised on mutual 
tolerance". 
9  South African Human Rights Commission v Qwelane; Qwelane v Minister for Justice 
and Correctional Services 2018 2 SA 149 (GJ) (hereafter the Qwelane case) para 
20. 
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protection against utterances which have a severe impact on the 
psychological well-being of vulnerable minorities in our society".10 The 
prohibition of expression aimed at hurting and harming others related to 
their group characteristics unmistakably reflects the undertaking in the 
preamble, and also empowers those who are targeted with an instrument of 
protection.11 
Botha and Govindjee agree that the Act's express intention to overcome 
unfair discrimination and to promote a more egalitarian society is an 
important contextual setting for interpreting the prohibited speech provisions 
of the Act. They also admit to a "causal link" between hate speech and unfair 
discrimination".12 They nevertheless insist that hate speech and unfair 
discrimination "must be treated as separate legal concepts"13 and advance 
the following doctrinal, textual, and comparative arguments in support of 
their viewpoint. 
2.1 Different tests for hate speech and unfair discrimination in terms 
of the Act  
Firstly, Botha and Govindjee argue that the test for unfair discrimination in 
section 6 of the Act differs substantially from the section 10(1) requirements 
for hate speech.14 They mention two considerations in this respect: whereas 
the test for unfair discrimination has to do with the effect of the impugned 
conduct, and not with the perpetrator's intent, hate speech by definition 
requires a clear intention to be hurtful, harmful or to incite hatred; in addition, 
unlike unfair discrimination, the section 10 hate speech definition does not 
rely on a comparator.15 
As to the first point, this can obviously not be a general conceptual 
proposition that, requiring intent for a particular form of unlawful conduct, 
excludes such conduct from qualifying as unfair discrimination. In as far as 
the argument is restricted to the narrower context of the specific textual 
provisions of the Act (which seems to be the case), it also fails to convince. 
The fact that the Act does not require intent for a finding of unfair 
discrimination generally in terms of sections 6 and 14 does not logically 
imply that it cannot do so for particular species of discrimination. Indeed, the 
                                            
10  Qwelane case paras 13-14. 
11  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 904. 
12  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9. We come back to this point somewhat later. See 
para 2.3. 
13  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9. 
14  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 7. 
15  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 7. 
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Act itself in section 12 explicitly prohibits certain types of expression as 
forms of unfair discrimination, for which "a clear intention to unfairly 
discriminate" is required. Sections 6 and 14 of the Act merely reflect settled 
jurisprudence that the intention to discriminate is not a requirement for a 
finding of unfair discrimination in all instances.16 
Moreover, even in a context restricted to applying sections 6 and 14 of the 
Act, intent can feature as a prominent fairness consideration. This will be 
most evident when the relevance of the purpose of the discriminatory 
conduct is considered.17 This is one of the pertinent fairness indicators also 
mentioned in section 14 of the Act.18 The importance of the purpose (and 
by implication of the intent) as a contextual fairness consideration was 
already appreciated in Harksen v Lane.19 The court held that if a 
discriminatory measure whose primary aim is the achievement of a worthy 
and important societal goal impinges upon the dignity of the complainants, 
or affects them in a comparably serious manner, the fact that this is not its 
intended result may have a significant bearing on the fairness enquiry. 
Conversely, a clearly discriminatory intent could therefore in particular 
circumstances decisively tilt the scales in the opposite direction. If 
discriminatory intent is a relevant – and sometimes even decisive – unfair 
discrimination consideration, then there is no clear conceptual or doctrinal 
dichotomy between the hate speech and unfair discrimination provisions of 
the Act. There is therefore no reason why the Act should not treat hate 
speech as a particular species of discrimination, for which a specific intent 
is a requirement. This, in principle, would not be different from other 
particular instances of discrimination where intent could be a conclusive 
factor for a finding of unfairness. There are also obvious instrumental 
reasons for requiring the demonstration of a clear and specific intent for hate 
speech discrimination: it attests to the particularly egregious nature of this 
                                            
16  President of RSA v Hugo 1997 6 BCLR 708 (CC) paras 42-43. Also see City Council 
of Pretoria v Walker 1998 3 BCLR 257 (CC) para 43: "There is nothing in the 
language of section 8(2) which necessarily calls for the section to be interpreted as 
requiring proof of intention to discriminate as a threshold requirement for either direct 
or indirect discrimination." 
17  In City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 3 BCLR 257 (CC) para 44, Langa CJ 
qualified his finding that intention is not a necessary requirement for unfair 
discrimination generally: "This does not mean that absence of an intention to 
discriminate is irrelevant to the enquiry. The section [8 of the interim Constitution] 
prohibits 'unfair' discrimination. The requirement of unfairness limits the application 
of the section and permits consideration to be given to the purpose of the conduct or 
action at the level of the enquiry into unfairness." 
18  Section 14(3)(f) of the Equality Act. 
19  Harksen v Lane 1997 11 BCLR 1489 (CC) 1510H. Also see Municipality of the City 
of Port Elizabeth v Rudman 1998 4 BCLR 451 (SE) 462A-C. 
ME MARAIS & JL PRETORIUS  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  7 
form of discrimination, and it is in addition a necessary element to prevent 
disproportionate invasions of the freedom of speech.20 
Furthermore, the section 10(1) prohibition is in fact concerned with impact 
and effect. The object of the prohibition is to protect target groups from the 
direct and ensuing hurtful and harmful impact and effects of exposure to the 
malicious communication of disrespect, scorn, or hatred related to group 
characteristics.21 These issues will be addressed in more detail later, in 
particular in the discussion of the harms associated with unfair 
discrimination and hate speech22 and the bona fide engagement in 
expression described in terms of the proviso.23 
The further argument that hate speech fits awkwardly within the definitional 
template of unfair discrimination, because a finding of hate speech does not 
hinge on the presence of a comparator group, is also unpersuasive. The 
comparator requirement in discrimination law obliges proof of the existence 
of a person or persons similarly situated to the discrimination claimant, 
except for the latter's protected characteristic, but who did not suffer the 
same discriminatory treatment. This is the traditional methodology in 
discrimination cases for proving that the impugned conduct is the reason for 
(or "based on") one or more of the prohibited grounds.24 In this respect, it is 
significant that the section 10 definition of hate speech is similarly worded 
to standard discrimination clauses, including section 9(3) of the Constitution 
and section 6 of the Equality Act.25 In line with these clauses, it also prohibits 
conduct "based on one or more of the prohibited grounds". If the authors 
                                            
20  The following dictum of Dickson CJ in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v Taylor 
1990 3 SCR 892 931-932 reflects the same approach pertaining to the issue of an 
element of intent: "The preoccupation with effects, and not with intent, is readily 
explicable when one considers that systemic discrimination is much more 
widespread in our society than is intentional discrimination. To import a subjective 
intent requirement into human rights provisions, rather than allowing tribunals to 
focus solely upon effects, would thus defeat one of the primary goals of anti-
discrimination statutes. At the same time, however, it cannot be denied that to ignore 
intent in determining whether a discriminatory practice has taken place according to 
s 13(1) increases the degree of restriction upon the constitutionally protected 
freedom of expression. This result flows from the realization that an individual open 
to condemnation and censure because his or her words may have an unintended 
effect will be more likely to exercise caution via self-censorship." 
21  See para 3.3.2.2. 
22  See para 2.3. 
23  See para 3.3.2.  
24  See, for instance, Van der Walt v Metcash Trading Ltd 2002 4 SA 317 (CC) para 49; 
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 6 SA 121 (CC) para 39. In the context of 
employment discrimination also see the cases mentioned in Pretorius, Klinck and 
Ngwena Employment Equity Law 3-6 fn 12. 
25  Also see s 6 of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
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are suggesting that the comparator methodology is an indispensable means 
of proving the causal link between the discriminatory conduct and a 
prohibited ground, then section 10 would clearly also necessitate a 
comparator, because it too requires the complainant to establish that the 
impugned speech is "based on" a prohibited ground. 
This elevation of the comparator methodology from a means of establishing 
the link between discriminatory conduct and a prohibited ground to an 
essential definitional element of discrimination needs, however, to be 
questioned. Fredman has pointed out that the comparator requirement is 
naturally linked to a formal understanding of equality as consistency of 
treatment.26 This conceptual association has become problematic with the 
development of "the notion of equality beyond consistency into a 
substantive concept, based on the fundamental values of dignity and 
respect for the individual".27 Whereas the comparator demand could 
arguably be seen as a necessary benchmark of equality as consistency, it 
lacks the same diagnostic status in relation to understandings of equality 
underpinned by dignity. In an earlier judgment, the Canadian Supreme 
Court stated that the purpose of the equality right is to "prevent the violation 
of human dignity and freedom through the imposition of limitations, 
disadvantages or burdens, through stereotypical application of presumed 
group characteristics".28 This, and not whether others are treated similarly 
or not, is the deciding factor for equality so understood. Equality as dignity 
can be violated even if groups are treated equally badly.29 Harassment 
jurisprudence has also long demonstrated that proof of a better-treated 
comparator is not a sine qua non for identifying harassment as a form of 
dignity-violating unfair discrimination.30 Moreover, unfair discrimination can 
                                            
26  Fredman Discrimination Law 8-10, 95-102, 108-111. Also see Fredman 2014 Int J 
Law Context 445. 
27  Fredman Discrimination Law 121; Fredman 2014 Int J Law Context 445-446. 
28  Miron v Trudel 1995 2 SCR 418 489. Also see President of RSA v Hugo 1997 6 
BCLR 708 (CC) para 41: "At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies 
a recognition that the purpose of our new constitutional and democratic order is the 
establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity 
and respect regardless of their membership of particular groups." More recently, the 
Canadian Supreme Court has qualified its reliance on human dignity in equality 
jurisprudence somewhat: see R v Kapp 2008 SCC 41; Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development) v Cunningham 2011 2 SCR 670. Also see Albertyn and 
Fredman 2015 Acta Juridica 430-455. 
29  Fredman Discrimination Law 18. 
30  See Fredman Discrimination Law 120-121; Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena 
Employment Equity Law ch 6 para 6.3; Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 780-785. Goldberg's 
analysis focusses mainly on employment discrimination, but has much wider 
doctrinal significance. It should also be noted that in so far as her analysis addresses 
the peculiarities of the relevant US laws and jurisprudence, not all of the concerns 
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take place in contexts where comparators are difficult to identify, or are even 
completely absent, such as workplace settings with an insufficient number 
of comparable co-workers,31 or homogenous workplaces or job categories, 
or workplaces with uniquely situated employees, with no easily identifiable 
similarly situated co-workers, etc.32 Goldberg has also questioned the 
functionality in today's economy of the use of comparators as the sole 
heuristic marker of employment discrimination on a protected ground.33 In 
a modern, mobile, knowledge-based economy, easily comparable jobs and 
therefore comparators have become more difficult to identify.34 
Straightforward comparison becomes problematic in the absence of 
workplace settings where multiple workers engage in fixed and easily 
comparable, standardised tasks.35 To the extent that contemporary jobs 
have become more flexible and dynamic in nature, the insistence on 
comparators does not sit comfortably with the modern world of work.36 
The comparator requirement also struggles to come to grips with more 
subtle and complex forms of discrimination which go beyond easily 
identifiable and overt forms of exclusion based on relatively "thin" (i.e. one-
dimensional) conceptions of protected identities.37 In employment 
discrimination theory, these forms of exclusion are sometimes referred to 
as "second-generation" discrimination cases.38 They do not result from overt 
or blatant forms of prejudice, but from the organisational and cultural 
dimensions of bias manifested in "patterns of interaction, informal norms, 
networking, mentoring, and evaluation".39 
Contemporary discrimination theories, such as intersectionality theory,40 
identity performance theory41 and structural discrimination theory42 have 
attempted to illuminate second-generation discrimination and to highlight 
the inadequacy of traditional jurisprudential tools (including the demand for 
                                            
raised are applicable to the South African legal position, to the extent that different 
textual and doctrinal approaches apply. 
31  Resulting in statistically small sample sizes that are not reliable for the purpose of 
comparison. 
32  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 753-764. 
33  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 758. 
34  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 731-732. 
35  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 755. 
36  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 756. 
37  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 735. Also see Sturm 2001 Colum L Rev 465-466. 
38  See eg Sturm 2001 Colum L Rev 458-568. 
39  Sturm 2001 Colum L Rev 458. 
40  Generally attributed to the work of Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw. See, for instance, 
Crenshaw 1989 U Chi Legal F 139-167; Crenshaw 1991 Stan L Rev 1241-1299. 
41  See Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 766-770 (especially the authors cited in fn 124). 
42  See Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 770-772. 
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a comparator) to come to grips with it. Intersectionality theory43 addresses 
how disadvantage is compounded by a combination of traits, such as race 
plus gender, which is not fully accounted for in legal methodologies that treat 
the protected identities in isolation. As Goldberg explains, the comparator 
requirement may struggle to bring forms of discrimination based on 
multidimensional identities onto its radar. The appropriate comparator may 
be difficult to identify ("Is it someone who shares neither of the individual's 
traits or shares one but not the other?").44 In addition, the fact that 
intersectional claimants are often small in number tends to undermine the 
evidentiary value of group-based comparisons.45 Identity performance 
theory is concerned with discrimination that results from people’s 
expressing ("performing") identity attributes in terms of styles of socialising, 
grooming, expression, etc.46 In workplace settings, identity styles are not 
always attributable to distinct categories such as race or gender in a 
monolithic sense, which also complicates the usefulness of the standard 
comparator methodology to expose this kind of discrimination.47 The aim of 
structural discrimination theory is to uncover discriminatory bias behind 
established workplace norms, structures and interactions.48 Also in this 
respect, Goldberg argues that comparators are unlikely to shed light on the 
identity traits that motivate the exclusionary interaction patterns in all but the 
most blatant situations.49 
What these examples illustrate is that a comparator, on its own, is not 
necessarily determinative of the group-based discriminatory nature of the 
perpetrator's conduct.50 Insisting, nevertheless, on proof that the perpetrator 
did not or would not have subjected other groups to the same discriminatory 
treatment would at best merely reinforce in an indirect way what had already 
been established directly, namely dignity-related, identity-based harm. It is 
for this reason, and not because hate speech is conceptually distinct from 
unfair discrimination, that section 10 does not require the comparator 
analysis. 
                                            
43  Crenshaw 1991 Stan L Rev 1242. 
44  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 736, 764-766.  
45  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 736, 764-766. 
46  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 736, 764-766, 766-767. 
47  See the American cases illustrating this point, discussed by Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 
736, 764-766, 768-770. 
48  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 736, 764-766, 770. 
49  Goldberg 2011 Yale LJ 736, 764-766, 737-738, 770-772. 
50  This is the implication of the harassment case mentioned above, for instance.  
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2.2  Section 15 of the Act  
Secondly, Botha and Govindjee51 state that the Act itself distinguishes 
between hate speech and discrimination because section 15 does not 
require fairness testing for hate speech. In our view this distinction does not 
imply that the expression described in section 10(1) is not a form of unfair 
discrimination. On the contrary, not requiring fairness testing in terms of 
section 14 of the Act merely acknowledges the fact that unfairness is 
intrinsic to the definitional terms of the categorical prohibition of hate speech 
in terms of section 10(1).52 
In addition, section 15 similarly excludes harassment from fairness testing, 
even though harassment is generally considered to be a form of unfair 
discrimination.53 Section 6(3) of the Employment Equity Act expressly states 
that harassment of an employee constitutes a form of unfair discrimination. 
In Liberty Group Limited v M54 the Labour Appeal Court stated that 
… (i)n treating harassment as a form of unfair discrimination in s 6(3), the EEA 
recognises that such conduct poses a barrier to the achievement of 
substantive equality in the workplace by creating an arbitrary barrier to the full 
and equal enjoyment of an employee's rights, violating that person's dignity 
and limiting their right to equality at work.55 
2.3  Different harms associated with unfair discrimination and hate 
speech 
Thirdly, Botha and Govindjee56 claim that a discriminatory "act or omission 
which unfairly imposes a burden or withholds a benefit57 on a prohibited 
ground is not comparable to speech that propagates hatred on a prohibited 
ground". They appear to believe that this is self-evident, since they offer no 
further elaboration. It is unclear why the harms associated with unfair 
discrimination and hate speech are incomparable.58 Hate speech plainly 
                                            
51  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 7. 
52  See Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 902-903. 
53  Cooper 2002 ILJ 1; Pretorius, Klinck and Ngwena Employment Equity Law ch 6 para 
6.2.1. 
54  Liberty Group Limited v M 2017 10 BLLR 991 (LAC).  
55  Liberty Group Limited v M 2017 10 BLLR 991 (LAC) para 32. 
56  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 8. 
57  They are referring here to the definition of "discrimination" in s 1 of the Equality Act 
as "any act or omission, including a policy, law, rule, practice, condition or situation 
which directly or indirectly (a) imposes burdens, obligations or disadvantage on, or 
(b) withholds benefits, opportunities or advantages from, any person on one or more 
of the prohibited grounds". 
58  Botha and Govindjee argue for the separate treatment of hate speech and 
discrimination so that they can be better regulated with reference inter alia to their 
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implies the social burden of exposing a group to public denigration, 
vilification, insult, marginalisation and threat. Being collectively branded by 
hateful stereotypes is also the converse of enjoying the benefit of group 
membership and social repute unburdened by a public discourse infected 
by group-directed animosity. The harms usually ascribed to hate speech are 
clearly generically exemplary of typical discriminatory harms. 
Botha and Govindjee in effect concede the similarity of the harms 
associated with hate speech and unfair discrimination generally where they 
discuss the "causal link" between the two.59 They state that "hate speech 
has the tendency to promote or perpetuate unfair discrimination, particularly 
when directed at vulnerable groups in society"; hate speech "seeks to 
delegitimise the members of target groups and has the tendency to create 
a climate in which the marginalisation and stereotyping of vulnerable groups 
is encouraged"; and that the regulation of hate speech and unfair 
discrimination "have a common objective, namely the protection of human 
dignity and equality and the eradication of systemic discrimination". If hate 
speech causes all the harmful things that are recorded here (group-based 
delegitimisation, marginalisation, stereotyping), and its prohibition aims at 
protecting human dignity, equality and the eradication of systemic 
discrimination, then it really is all about unfair discrimination.60 
2.4  International law 
Fourthly, Botha and Govindjee contend that their approach is vindicated by 
international law, in particular the International Convention on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966) (the "ICCPR")  and the International Covenant on the 
Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (1965) (the "ICERD"), 
"where it is accepted that the phenomena of discrimination and hate speech 
are distinguishable".61 In support of this view, they refer to the fact that unfair 
discrimination and hate speech are dealt with in separate provisions in both 
of these instruments. Article 20(2) of the ICCPR obliges States parties to 
prohibit hate speech as defined by it, and article 26 entitles everyone to 
equality.62 They argue that the advocacy of hatred which incites to 
                                            
"own particular harms". See Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9. We elaborate on 
this point further in para 3.2. 
59  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 8. 
60  See the discussion in para 3.2. 
61  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9. 
62  Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (the 
ICCPR) reads as follows: "All persons are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, 
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discrimination in terms of article 20(2) is not concerned with "differentiation 
alone", and that there is a distinction between the obligation to regulate 
speech that incites to discriminate and the prevention of acts of 
discrimination.63 They premise their distinction between hate speech and 
discrimination on the definition of discrimination in terms of the ICERD, as 
adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) for the purposes of 
the ICCPR, namely: 
… any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground … and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of 
rights and freedoms.64 
As far as the ICERD is concerned, Botha and Govindjee note that article 
4(a) requires States parties to take positive steps to criminalise the 
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to 
racial discrimination and incitement to acts of violence against a target 
group, while article 5 requires the elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination.65 They conclude that this signifies that the purpose of the 
ICERD is to safeguard vulnerable groups from instances of discrimination 
and hate speech.66 The authors do not elaborate much on the criteria they 
identify as suggestive of a conceptual difference between discrimination and 
hate speech. They do not explain what they mean by the phrase 
"differentiation alone".67 This notion, as purportedly characteristic of 
discrimination, can obviously not be understood literally, since that would 
contradict the established principle that discrimination, as a legal concept, 
always entails more than mere differentiation.68 We presume that what they 
have in mind here is that hate speech has distinct characteristics setting it 
                                            
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status." 
63  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 10. 
64  UNHRC General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination (1989) para 7. 
65  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 10. 
66  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 10. 
67  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 10 fn 39. The authors rely here on a statement by 
Ghanea 2010 IJMGR 429, which they seem to misread. Ghanea argues that since 
discrimination legally entails more than mere differentiation of treatment, the 
prohibition of the advocacy of hatred that "incites discrimination" must consequently 
also entail more than "differentiation alone". Therefore, since both hate speech and 
discrimination are premised on more than "differentiation alone", the latter offers no 
basis of distinction between the two concepts. Ghanea squarely situates the 
ICCPR's prohibition of the advocacy of hatred within the state's "overarching role in 
obliterating … discrimination through multifaceted interventions at different levels". 
68  UNHRC General Comment No 18: Non-discrimination (1989) para 13: "not every 
differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such 
differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose 
which is legitimate under the Covenant". 
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apart from discrimination generally (as the latter is typically defined in the 
ICERD). The special characteristics mainly concern the elements of 
advocacy of hatred and incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. If 
this is the correct understanding, then it raises the same point we have dealt 
with already, namely that a legal instrument may prescribe different 
requirements for different species of discrimination. In paragraph 2.1 we 
refuted the argument that the requirement of a particular intent for hate 
speech necessarily disqualifies it from being classified as a form of 
discrimination. Equally, in paragraph 2.3 we showed how the harms 
normally associated with hate speech are generically related to typically 
unfair discrimination harms. We also noted that harassment is generally 
recognised as a form of discrimination, despite its distinguishing features. 
By arguing for the recognition of hate speech as a particular species of 
discrimination, we acknowledge that, logically, hate speech must therefore 
display characteristics setting it apart from other forms of discrimination. 
These distinguishing characteristics, however, do not place hate speech 
outside the conceptual realm of identity-based discrimination. In General 
Recommendation No 35, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) itself clearly identifies racial hate speech as a form 
of discrimination by noting how article 4 is integrally linked with other 
provisions of the ICERD in the elimination of racial discrimination "in all its 
forms", and also by emphasising the integral connection between articles 4 
and 5.69 In General Recommendation 15, the CERD notes that "[w]hen the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination was being adopted, article 4 was regarded as central to the 
struggle against racial discrimination".70 Thornberry aptly states that "(i)n 
the complex aetiology of racial discrimination, the transmission of racist 
ideas and attitudes through multiple forms and occasions of hate speech 
plays an indispensable role", and that the elements of hate speech in terms 
of article 4 of the ICERD can be linked in "a common ethos of preventing 
racial discrimination".71 In his commentary on the CERD's General 
Recommendation No 35, Thornberry also fittingly observes that "(t)he title 
                                            
69  CERD General Recommendation No 35: Combating Racist Hate Speech (2013) 
para 8. 
70  CERD General Recommendation No 15 on Article 4 of the Convention (1993) para 
1. Also see the ICTR Trial Chamber in Nahimana v The Prosecutor ICTR-99-52-A 
para 1076, which held that the proscription of hate speech represents customary 
international law on the basis of its intrinsic relationship to the norm of non-
discrimination: "hate speech that expresses ethnic and other forms of discrimination 
violates the norm of customary international law prohibiting discrimination". 
71  Thornberry "Forms of Hate Speech and ICERD" 3, 10. 
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of ICERD refers to the elimination of 'all forms' of racial discrimination, 
including speech forms".72 
We conclude that in so far as the ICERD and the ICCPR draw a distinction 
between "the obligation to regulate speech that incites to discriminate and 
the prevention of acts of discrimination", this does not rise to the level of a 
conceptual difference as contended by Botha and Govindjee.73 
3  The constitutionality of section 10(1) 
3.1  The constitutional framework 
Both sections 16(2)(c) of the Constitution and 10(1) of the Equality Act are 
concerned with harmful expression related to group characteristics and can 
be described as hate speech provisions on this basis. The provisions 
should, however, be distinguished as far as their scope and aims are 
concerned. Section 16(2) of the Constitution places extreme anti-
democratic expression, including hate speech in terms of section 16(2)(c), 
outside the ambit of constitutional protection.74 This categorical exclusion 
calls for robust legislative and other measures, including criminalisation, to 
combat the serious threat of the incitement that it describes. Section 
16(2)(c) narrowly defines hate speech as "advocacy of hatred that is based 
on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to 
cause harm". On the other hand, section 10(1) of the Equality Act is primarily 
concerned with the regulation of hurtful and harmful expression related to 
group characteristics in a much broader sphere that exceeds the ambit of 
unprotected expression under section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution to also 
involve prima facie protected expression. The broader scope of section 
10(1) is related to the primary transformative aim of the Act, in particular the 
obligation in terms of section 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution to prohibit and 
prevent unfair discrimination. We therefore expressed the view that these 
                                            
72  Thornberry Date unknown https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Racism/ 
IWG/Session15/CERD_GR35.docx 1. 
73  Also see Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 5 
BCLR 433 (CC) para 31: "There is no doubt that the state has a particular interest in 
regulating this type of expression because of the harm it may pose to the 
constitutionally mandated objective of building the non-racial and non-sexist society 
based on human dignity and the achievement of equality. There is accordingly no 
bar to the enactment of legislation that prohibits such expression." 
76 Section 16(2) of the Constitution provides that the right in s 16(1) "does not extend 
to (a) propaganda for war; (b) incitement of imminent violence or; (c) advocacy of 
hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes 
incitement to cause harm". 
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sections provide "the more directly applicable context within which to 
interpret section 10".75 
Botha and Govindjee, however, maintain that the constitutionality of section 
10(1) should not be tested with reference to the fairness standard for 
discrimination. They contend that 
… a preferable approach is that the determination whether the limitation to 
freedom of expression in section 10(1) appropriately balances the rights to 
freedom of expression, human dignity and equality, and is a necessary, 
rational and proportionate measure, should be left to section 36 of the 
Constitution.76 
There appears to be some misunderstanding here. Our view that the hate 
speech provisions of the Equality Act are primarily intended to give effect to 
section 9 of the Constitution does not mean that section 9 is the only 
applicable standard for measuring the Act's constitutionality, or that equality 
interests would be dogmatically privileged where competing interests or 
rights are at play.77 Whenever the Act is challenged on the basis of a 
possible infringement of any competing right, then the right to equality and 
non-discrimination will feature as an important but relative factor in the 
context of a proportionality analysis. If for instance the constitutionality of 
section 10(1) of the Act is contested in terms of section 16 as an unjustifiable 
restriction on freedom of expression, the fact that the Act is intended to 
realise the foundational value and right to equality and non-discrimination 
will be an important consideration in the context of applying section 36 of 
the Constitution. We did not suggest that the equality consideration should 
replace or necessarily dominate the section 36 proportionality inquiry in a 
situation-insensitive manner. We do not maintain, as suggested by Botha 
and Govindjee, that equality should be disproportionally favoured at the 
expense of freedom of expression.78 We acknowledge that not all 
discriminatory speech rises to the level of the kind of discriminatory hate 
speech that would justify the most stringent forms of suppression. We are 
mindful of Ghanea's caution that in order to ensure that freedom of speech 
is not unnecessarily restricted in terms of hate speech proscriptions, "states 
must show that the harm of discrimination cannot be ameliorated by means 
other than the suppression of protected speech".79 
                                            
75  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 902. 
76  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 11. 
77  This is what Botha and Govindjee apparently believe that we suggest: Botha and 
Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9, 27-28. 
78  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 9. 
79  Ghanea 2010 IJMGR 430-431. 
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Our viewpoint does, however, ensure that the appropriate balance between 
the rights to freedom of expression and equality is achieved in accordance 
with the value structure of our Constitution, in which the promotion of 
equality occupies a central place.80 Our approach could therefore shape the 
proportionality inquiry's outcome in a way different from what would have 
been the case if the hate speech provisions of the Act were primarily 
intended to give effect to section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution. The fact that 
these provisions are meant to realise the right to and foundational value of 
equality will, for instance, add considerable weight to the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation (section 36(1)(b) of the Constitution). It may be 
important enough to outweigh the fact that section 10(1) of the Act is not a 
mirror image of section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution.81 We expand on this in 
the following sections. 
3.2  Vagueness and overreach 
Botha and Govindjee believe that section 10(1) of the Act is on 
constitutionally thin ice, due to both vagueness and overreach.82 Their 
primary concerns are that section 10(1) lacks a rational connection to its 
purpose and that it disproportionally favours the interests it seeks to 
protect.83 The chief reason for these defects is that section 10(1) can 
proscribe hurtful inter-personal speech84 that does not require 
consequential harm and is not specifically group-related, ie resulting in 
individual as opposed to societal harm.85 The textual context for this 
perceived flaw is that section 10(1) prohibits speech "based on one or more 
                                            
80  See the following dictum in Brink v Kitshoff 1996 6 BCLR 752 (CC) para 33: "It is not 
surprising that equality is a recurrent theme in the Constitution. As this court has said 
in other judgments, the Constitution is an emphatic renunciation of our past in which 
inequality was systematically entrenched." Also see S v Makwanyane 1995 6 BCLR 
665 (CC) paras 218, 262, 322; Shabalala v Attorney-General, Transvaal 1995 12 
BCLR 1593 (CC) para 26; National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister 
of Justice 1998 12 BCLR 1517 (CC) para 60; Qwelane case para 13. 
81  See Qwelane case para 64. 
82  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 27. The constitutional challenge against s 10 of the 
Equality Act on these grounds was rejected in the Qwelane case paras 57-59. 
83  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 27. 
84  Although this issue was not specifically raised in the respective articles under 
discussion, in view of the recent finding of the Equality Court in the Qwelane case 
para 60 in favour of a conjunctive reading of ss 10(1)(a), (b) and (c) of the Equality 
Act, it is worth mentioning that in our view a conjunctive reading will be textually 
strained and will exclude crucial aspects of hate speech as unfair discrimination from 
the ambit of s 10(1) of the Act. See the discussion of differing Equality Court 
approaches to this aspect in SAHRC 2019 https://www.sahrc.org.za/ 
home/21/files/SAHRC%20Finding%20Julius%20Malema%20&%20Other%20Marc
h%202019.pdf. para 4.2. 
85  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 15-17. 
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of the prohibited grounds, against any person, that could reasonably be 
construed to demonstrate a clear intention to be hurtful or harmful".86 In their 
view, this implies a misguided emphasis on speech intended "to be hurtful 
when communicated about any person, as opposed to that which vilifies and 
ostracises the group". They argue that the purpose of hate speech 
regulation should not be to safeguard the "emotional well-being of 
individuals", but to prohibit expression that "reinforces and perpetuates 
patterns of discrimination and inequality" and which undermines national 
unity, tolerance and reconciliation in society".87 
Regarding the first point of concern, Botha and Govindjee claim that the 
inclusion of hurtful inter-personal speech without a link to resultant harm is 
not rationally related to the "legislative purpose of addressing the 
marginalisation and systemic discrimination of groups".88 In our view, this 
line of reasoning is premised on a narrow understanding of the direct and 
indirect group-related harm inflicted through hurtful speech.89 In this 
respect, Benesch states that hate speech 
… directly affects its targets – the people it purports to describe – by 
frightening, offending, humiliating or denigrating them. This often has the 
secondary effect of silencing them, by means of fear. Speech can also harm 
indirectly (but no less severely) by inciting, or pitting members of one group of 
people against another.90 
Gelber refers to 
… a considerable body of literature that has developed over the last few 
decades, which discusses how hate speech is expression that materially and 
substantively harms its targets in the saying of that speech (and not only in 
terms of a discreet, consequential harm arising from it).91 
According to this literature, the defining features of hate speech are 
… that it incurs harms discursively when the hate speech is uttered, and that 
these harms are analogous to other discriminatory harms, such as denying 
someone a service or denying them a job on the ground of their race or other 
relevant attribute.92 
                                            
86  We will return to this aspect later. 
87  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 16, with reference to Islamic Unity Convention v 
Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 5 BCLR 433 (CC). See Saskatchewan 
(Human Rights Commission) v Whatcott 2013 1 SCR 467 (hereafter the Whatcott 
case) paras 80-82. 
88  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 16-17. 
89  See para 2.3. 
90  Benesch "Defining and Diminishing Hate Speech" 19. 
91  Gelber 2017 Constitutional Commentary 620. 
92  Gelber 2017 Constitutional Commentary 621. 
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The discriminatory effects of hate speech include 
… that others were persuaded of negative stereotypes, a conditioning of the 
environment such that racism was normalized, subordination, silencing, fear, 
victimization, emotional symptoms, restrictions on freedom, lowering of self-
esteem, maintenance of social imbalances of power, and undermining of their 
dignity.93 
Secondly, Botha and Govindjee also draw too stark a line between 
individually hurtful or harmful speech and speech that "vilifies and ostracises 
the group". Section 10(1) does not cover hurtful or harmful speech directed 
at an individual based solely on his or her "uniquely personal 
characteristics".94 Since it requires speech to be based on one or more of 
the prohibited grounds, only speech aimed at imputed group characteristics 
is included in the definition of hate speech. Hate speech remains a group-
directed attack, even when communicated "against any person". By 
definition, hate speech does not target the individual in purely individual 
terms, but as representative of the negative characteristics ascribed to the 
group. The hurt or harm against which section 10(1) protects does therefore 
not include the "emotional well-being of individuals" unconnected to their 
group association. Section 10(1) acknowledges that to the extent that 
groups are "part of the psychological self",95 no stark boundaries distinguish 
group- and individual-directed hate speech. Stereotypical comments about 
groups can elicit as strong and intense emotional responses as identical 
personal comments.96 The section 10(1) prohibition of hate speech against 
an individual is therefore clearly also rationally related to the purpose of 
proscribing speech that "reinforces and perpetuates patterns of 
discrimination and inequality", and which "undermines national unity, 
tolerance and reconciliation in society". 
Botha and Govindjee also raise the concern that the inclusion of the word 
"communicate" in section 10(1) adds a concept so wide that it opens the 
door to the regulation of a broad range of private speech, "even where the 
speaker does not intend to advocate hatred or incite harm and even if a 
member of the target group does not hear the speech".97 They propose the 
insertion of a "publicity" element in section 10(1), "namely that the speech 
                                            
93  Gelber 2017 Constitutional Commentary 623; Qwelane case para 65. 
94  This terminology is used in the Whatcott case para 84. 
95  Garcia et al 2006 Group Process Intergr Relat 308. Also see R v Keegstra 1990 3 
SCR 697 746, where Dickson CJ noted: "[a] person's sense of human dignity and 
belonging to the community at large is closely linked to the concern and respect 
accorded the groups to which he or she belongs". 
96  R v Keegstra 1990 3 SCR 697 746-747. 
97  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 12. 
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should occur in the hearing or presence of the public in a public place, or 
that it should be published or disseminated to the public".98 
We agree that the section 10(1) hate speech prohibition should not apply to 
conversation in private.99 We argued that section 10 does not clearly 
exclude private communication, probably owing to bad formulation in 
particular of the phrase "no person may publish, propagate, advocate or 
communicate words". Words can be published and used to advocate, 
propagate and communicate ideas, feelings, opinions and knowledge, but 
cannot be advocated or propagated themselves. We accordingly proposed 
that the phrase "no person may publish, propagate, advocate or 
communicate words" should read, or be amended to read, "no person may 
publish expressive content100 that propagates, advocates or communicates 
ideas or views".101 This formulation will clearly exclude private conversation 
from the ambit of section 10(1) and will also address the textual anomaly.102 
We will now further explain our view that section 10(1), subject to the 
amendment (or interpretation) that we have proposed, despite the 
broadness of some of its terms, does not unduly infringe upon the right to 
freedom of expression. This necessitates a closer look at the proviso in 
section 12 of the Equality Act, since it is primarily intended to further clarify 
and limit the scope of prohibited hate speech in section 10(1). Many of our 
differences with Botha and Govindjee regarding the Equality Act's purported 
vagueness and over-breadth can be attributed to differing interpretations of 
the role and terms of the proviso. 
                                            
98  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 12-13. 
99  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 907-908. See our discussion of the principle laid 
down in Canadian cases that it is not about "whether the statement is communicated 
in a setting that is private, but rather whether it is conveyed other than in private 
conversation". 
100  Botha and Govindjee agree that the term "words" should be replaced. They propose 
"expression" or "acts of expression". See Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ para 
3.1.1; Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ para 3.1. 
101  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ para 3.1.1. We did not argue that the "'publish, 
propagate, advocate or communicate' phrase in section 10(1) should be amended 
to provide that no person may propagate, advocate or communicate expressive 
content which meets the other section 10(1) requirements" as presented by Botha 
and Govindjee. See Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ para 3.1. 
102  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ para 3.1.1. 
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3.3  The role and interpretation of the proviso in section 12 of the 
Equality Act 
3.3.1  The function of the proviso103 in the context of section 10 of the Act 
Botha and Govindjee submit that 
… the proviso's role is to create a defence for a respondent, who will need to 
prove that the speech falls within its ambit and should thus be precluded from 
prohibition (even though it meets the respective section 10 and 12 threshold 
tests). 
We do not agree. In our view when expression falls within the ambit of the 
proviso, it is a clear indication that it essentially does not meet the section 
10(1) requirements. To use the phrasing of the Constitutional Court in 
Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority,104 albeit in 
a different context, the proviso "defines the boundaries beyond which" the 
section 10(1) prohibition "does not extend". It describes expression with 
characteristics that essentially fall outside the section 10 definition of hate 
speech.105 We described the proviso as a "modifier" in the sense of "a word 
or phrase that makes specific the meaning of another word or phrase".106 
The Supreme Court of Canada illustrates our point in the Whatcott case.107 
The issue was the constitutionality of a hate speech provision of the 
Saskatchewan Human Rights Code108 that resembles section 10(1) of the 
Equality Act, albeit without a provision similar to the section 12 proviso. The 
Court nonetheless considered that "in the normal course of events, 
expression that targets a protected group in the context of satire, or news 
reports about hate speech perpetrated by someone else, would not likely 
constitute hate speech".109 In our view, the section 12 proviso simply 
excludes these and other forms of expression explicitly from the prohibition. 
                                            
103  Section 12 of the Equality Act is quoted in para 2. 
104  In Islamic Unity Convention v Independent Broadcasting Authority 2002 5 BCLR 433 
(CC) para 30 the Constitutional Court describes s 16(2) of the Constitution as 
"definitional" in the sense that it "defines the boundaries beyond which the right to 
freedom of expression does not extend". 
105  In our view this clarification saves s 10 of the Equality Act from what the Equality 
Court referred to as "impermissible vagueness". See the Qwelane case paras 56 
and 59. 
106  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 18; Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 911. See 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary 2011 https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/modifier. 
107   See Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 8, 10, 13, 15, 16, 27, 28. 
108  Saskatchewan Human Rights Code 1979 Ch S-24.1 s 14(1)(b). 
109  Whatcott case para 53. 
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The perception that hate speech that complies with the essential terms of 
section 10(1) is potentially justifiable is inaccurate and confusing. It should 
be clearly understood that even visual art, poetry, newspaper articles and 
scientific and academic publications may constitute or contain hate speech 
as contemplated by section 10(1) of the Equality Act. In the Saskatchewan 
case it was argued that the absence of defences of truth and sincerely held 
belief rendered the provision overbroad. The Court held that 
… in not providing for a defence of truth, the legislature has said that even 
truthful statements may be expressed in language or context that exposes a 
vulnerable group to hatred.110 
The same reasoning applies to the forms of expression listed in the section 
12 proviso of the Equality Act. 
Botha and Govindjee's main criticism of our approach that the proviso does 
not provide defences to justify hate speech is that it increases the burden 
that is placed on a complainant.111 According to them it requires a 
complainant to prove a negative (that the expression does not fall under the 
proviso) and denies the respondent the benefit of a defence. This effect, in 
their view, contradicts the principle that in unfair discrimination cases a 
complainant is required to make out only a prima facie case of unfair 
discrimination, as well as the Equality Act's purpose to provide the victims 
of hate speech and unfair discrimination with accessible forums to pursue 
complaints.112 We do not agree that our approach affects the burden of 
proof. The same overall onus of proof on the applicant and the onus of 
rebuttal on the respondent will apply, regardless of whether the proviso 
operates as descriptive of the prohibited conduct or as a complete defence 
in justification of prohibited conduct.113 The shifting of the burden of proof in 
an unfair discrimination matter in terms of section 6 of the Act is related to 
the presumption of fairness that comes into operation once discrimination 
on a listed round is established.114 As a categorical prohibition not subject 
to fairness testing in terms of section 14 of the Act, section 10 clearly does 
not involve a presumption of unfairness.115 
                                            
112  Whatcott case paras 141-142. 
111  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 19-29. 
112  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 19. 
113  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 572-573. 
114  Schwikkard and Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 499-500. 
115  Section 15 of the Equality Act provides that in cases of hate speech and harassment 
s 14 does not apply. 
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3.3.2  "Bona fide engagement" 
3.3.2.1  The textual reading 
Botha and Govindjee contend that the "bona fide engagement" requirement 
qualifies the forms of expression enumerated in the proviso with the 
exception of the "publication of any information, advertisement or notice". 
They consider this interpretation to be based on grammatical correctness.116 
This interpretation entails various problems, as also pointed out by Botha 
and Govindjee and addressed in our following response. 
We interpreted the "bona fide engagement" phrase as qualifying each of the 
forms of expression enumerated in the proviso. We also linked these forms 
of expression with the specified freedoms enumerated in terms of section 
16(1) of the Constitution, namely the freedom of the press, the freedom to 
receive information, the freedom of artistic creativity, academic freedom and 
the freedom of scientific research. We concluded that the proviso essentially 
covers bona fide engagement in all forms of expression that enjoy 
constitutional protection in terms of section 16(1) of the Constitution.117 This 
understanding makes it clear that section 10 is concerned with expression 
that is not in good faith (malicious).118 We contended that expression will 
not be in good faith when it abuses the freedoms that are stipulated in terms 
of section 16(1) of the Constitution, with the aim to hurt and harm or to 
promote or incite hatred related to group identity as contemplated in terms 
of section 10(1).119 An academic article on homosexuality referring to 
homosexual people in degrading terms serves as an example. The primary 
aim of the abusive remarks will be reasonably perceived to be intended to 
hurt and harm homosexual people and not to communicate or publish 
scientific information, regardless of whether the scientific view approves or 
condemns homosexuality.120 
Botha and Govindjee acknowledge that our suggestion that the "bona fide 
engagement" phrase applies to all the forms of expression enumerated in 
terms of the proviso "offers a potential solution to the over-breadth problem" 
that they have identified.121 They do not, however, consider this 
                                            
116  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 20. 
117  Hate speech defined in terms of s 16(2)(c) of the Constitution can by no means be 
bona fide and is therefore categorically excluded from the proviso. See the 
discussion of the phrase "in accordance with section 16 of the Constitution" in para 
3.6.3. 
118  See para 3.3.2.2. 
119  See para 3.3.2.2. 
120  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ paras 3.2.3-3.2.6. 
121  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ para 4.3.1. 
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interpretation as a viable option as, in their view, "it is strained and not 
textually sound".122 They argue that if the words "bona fide engagement" are 
reinserted immediately after the word "or" in the proviso, the proviso would 
read as follows: "provided that bona fide engagement publication of any 
information, advertisement or notice …". Their version, however, does not 
reflect our proposal. We will now clarify our textual reading by using 
brackets, highlighting the relevant phrase, and underlining the respective 
listed forms of expression as follows: 
Provided that bona fide engagement [in artistic creativity, academic and 
scientific inquiry, fair and accurate reporting in the public interest123 or 
publication of any information, advertisement or notice] in accordance 
with section 16 of the Constitution, is not precluded by this section. 
We do not agree that this reading is textually strained. On the contrary, as 
will be corroborated by the further analysis of the terms of the proviso, it fits 
in effortlessly with an overall logical understanding of all the different 
aspects of the proviso within the context of section 10 of the Act, and it is 
compatible with the constitutional imperative to uphold the right to freedom 
of expression. 
3.3.2.2 The meaning of "bona fide" 
Botha and Govindjee do not entirely differ from our interpretation of the 
phrase "bona fide", but find our reference to the "subjective conviction" of 
the speaker confusing. They submit that it should rather be considered 
"whether the form of expression in issue, assessed in its entirety and in the 
light of its context and purpose, can genuinely and legitimately be regarded 
as the engagement in artistic creativity, scientific enquiry or fair and 
accurate reporting in the public interest".124 The confusion relates to their 
sole consideration of the bona fide nature of the forms of expression 
enumerated in the proviso, and not also the bona fides of the speaker's 
"engagement". "(B)ona fide engagement" in the proviso is in contrast to the 
                                            
122  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ para 4.3.1.  
123  An interpretation that the group of speech forms before the "or" and the category of 
speech after it (namely the "publication of any information, advertisement or notice 
in accordance with section 16 of the Constitution") are separated by the "or", in our 
view requires a comma before the "or". On the other hand, the absence of a comma 
is in accordance with the generally acceptable approach that a serial comma is not 
required before the last item of a list with three or more items. See Fowler and 
Butterfield Fowler's Dictionary of Modern English Usage 30. 
124  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 21. 
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malicious intention required in terms of section 10(1).125 We will now explain 
our understanding of this aspect in more detail. 
The Collins Thesaurus of the English Language126 provides the following 
synonyms for "bona fide": "genuine; real; true; legal; actual; legitimate; 
authentic; honest; veritable; lawful; on the level". The online Cambridge 
English Dictionary describes "genuine" as follows: "If something is genuine, 
it is real and exactly what it appears to be… If people or emotions are 
genuine, they are honest and sincere." We applied these descriptions 
respectively to determine the bona fides of the speaker and the bona fide 
nature of the relevant forms of expression. 
The proviso is concerned with bona fide, in the sense of honest and sincere, 
engagement in bona fide, in the sense of authentic, protected forms of 
expression.127 The proviso makes it clear that when a speaker bona fide 
(honestly or sincerely) engages in, for instance, artistic creativity, the work 
of art will not fall under section 10(1) even if it hurts or harms related to 
group identity. Bona fide engagement in expression is the opposite of the 
malicious abuse of expression.128 An example of the malicious abuse of a 
bona fide form of expression will be when an authentic painting depicting 
the flogging of a slave is placed on the doorstep of a black person who has 
moved into a white neighbourhood. It is rather obvious that the promotion 
of hatred will never be bona fide. 
The determination of malicious intent by means of a reasonableness 
assessment addresses Botha and Govindjee's concern that "at this level the 
focus should be on remedying the harm caused by hate speech, as opposed 
to the subjective intention of the hatemonger".129 Hate speech regulation is 
                                            
125  The online Cambridge English dictionary describes "engage in something" as "to 
take part in or do something" (Cambridge Dictionary 2016 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english). 
126  Collins Thesaurus of the English Language. 
127  See Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 21. 
128  These attributes of malice are reflected in the following dictum in The Citizen 1978 
(Pty) Ltd v McBride 2011 8 BCLR 816 (CC) paras 104-105: "Counsel for Mr McBride 
insisted that the Citizen's comments were malicious. Counsel submitted that the 
Citizen published the articles out of personal spite and ill-will towards Mr McBride, 
and not out of any wish to engage in public debate about his suitability for the post. 
Counsel indeed contended that the articles manifested hatred towards Mr McBride 
that went beyond the bounds of fair comment. This goes so far as to suggest that 
the views the Citizen expressed were not honestly held. The question is whether the 
evidence established, first, that the Citizen's view as to Mr McBride's suitability for 
appointment was genuinely held and, second, if it was, whether the Citizen abused 
its right to express that view, 'for malice indicates an abuse of right, which makes 
unlawful that which would otherwise have been lawful'." 
129  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 15. 
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essentially concerned with the affront to human dignity caused by the 
exposure to another's contempt of the addressee's group characteristics. 
Determination of the presence of malicious intention in the form of contempt, 
scorn or hatred can therefore not be excluded from the analysis.130 
3.3.3 "[I]n accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution" 
Botha and Govindjee contend that "the appendage of the phrase 'in 
accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution' to the end of the proviso 
adds little value to the proviso's meaning".131 They understand the phrase 
to require a case by case analysis to determine whether or not the form or 
forms of expression to which it applies should have been excluded from the 
prohibition in the first place.132 However, they concede that to categorically 
exclude a form of expression from prohibition, and then to require the said 
case by case analysis, does not make sense. In an attempt to address or 
minimise this problem, they reason that the phrase "in accordance with 
section 16(1) of the Constitution" qualifies only the last-mentioned form of 
expression enumerated in terms of the proviso, namely "publication of any 
information, advertisement or notice", and that this phrase in turn specifically 
refers to the prohibition of the publication or display of any advertisement or 
notice in terms of section 12(b) of the Act. They speculate that "the drafters 
attempted to reproduce the essence of section 12 of the Act133 and then to 
exclude such forms of expression from liability if published 'in accordance 
with section 16 of the Constitution'". They finally reiterate that this 
interpretation does not solve the problem of distinguishing expression "in 
accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution" from expression outside 
the ambit of the proviso.134 
Our understanding of the phrase "in accordance with section 16(1) of the 
Constitution" is that it simply excludes expression under section 16(2), in 
particular section 16(2)(c), of the Constitution, which is expression not in 
accordance with the Constitution,135 from the ambit of the proviso. The 
exclusion makes perfect sense, because expression that incites harm as 
                                            
130  See para 3.3.2.2. 
131  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 22. See our discussion on the nature of expression 
under s16(2)(c) of the Constitution in para 3.1. 
132  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 22, 24-25. 
133  Section 12 of the Equality Act reads as follows: "Subject to the proviso in section 12, 
no person may (a) disseminate or broadcast any information; (b) publish or display 
any advertisement or notice, that could reasonably be construed or reasonably be 
understood to demonstrate a clear intention to unfairly discriminate against any 
person." 
134  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 24. 
135  See para 3.1. 
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envisaged in terms of section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution can never 
constitute bona fide engagement in expression that enjoys constitutional 
protection and should not be treated as if constitutional compliance were a 
possibility.136 
We also have substantial textual problems with Botha and Govindjee's 
linking of the phrase "in accordance with section 16(1) of the Constitution" 
to "publication of any information, advertisement or notice" only. The proviso 
explicitly applies to both sections 10 and 12 and the latter covers not only 
the publication or display of any advertisement or notice but also the 
dissemination or broadcast of any information. 
In line with our reasoning that the forms of expression listed in the proviso 
relate to the freedoms in terms of section 16(1) of the Constitution, we 
contend that in the context of the proviso "the publication of any information, 
advertisement or notice" gives effect to the "freedom to receive or impart 
information or ideas".137 Furthermore, considering the broad definitions of 
the terms "inform" and "information" that we referred to,138 we concluded 
that the exclusion of bona fide engagement in the "publication of any 
information, advertisement or notice" from the ambit of section 10(1) 
narrows it down significantly. 
This interpretation also addresses Botha and Govindjee's concern that the 
media protection afforded in terms of the proviso is too narrow.139 We 
insisted that not only the proviso's "fair and accurate reporting in the public 
interest" can be linked with the guarantee of media freedom in section 
16(1)(a) of the Constitution, but other listed forms of expression too.140 It 
can hardly be denied that publication of information, artistic creativity and 
academic and scientific enquiry occur in the media. 
                                            
136  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ para 4.3.2. 
137  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ para 3.2.4. 
138  The definitions and interpretations included that "to inform someone about or of 
something" means "to give them knowledge or information about it" or "to tell them 
about it", that the right to inform includes the right "to offend, shock or disturb" and 
that free expression is also generally understood to include the dissemination of 
incorrect information or of an understanding or view that is based on a 
misconception. 
139  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 24; Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 925 (not 926 
as indicated) and 912. 
140  Marais and Pretorius 2015 PELJ 925. 
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4 The authors' proposal 
Botha and Govindjee, in summary, express concern that the communication 
of hurtful words on a prohibited ground against any person falls within the 
ambit of section 10 and that the proviso exempts such expression only if it 
amounts to the bona fide engagement in artistic creativity, academic or 
scientific enquiry, or the bona fide engagement in fair and accurate reporting 
in the public interest. They claim that the proviso thus limits the broad effect 
of sections 10 and 12, but does not "temper the fact that these prohibitions 
limit the freedom of expression in terms more extensive than section 16(2) 
of the Constitution". They add that even if they are incorrect in their view 
that the latter part of the proviso ("the publication of any information, 
advertisement or notice in accordance with 16 of the Constitution") applies 
only to section 12 of the Act, the meaning is vague and causes uncertainty 
to the extent that the limitation to freedom of expression cannot be justified 
in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.141 They therefore suggest the 
following amendment to section 10: 
No person may publish, propagate, or advocate any form of expression in 
public against an identifiable group of persons on one or more of the prohibited 
grounds that could reasonably be construed to demonstrate a clear intention 
to promote hatred against such group and which is likely to cause harm.142 
The phrase "against any person" is removed.143 They also extend the 
application beyond the four prohibited grounds mentioned in section 
16(2)(c) of the Constitution, to include all the prohibited grounds.144 Instead 
of section 16(2)(c) of the Constitution's restriction to advocacy as the 
relevant means of communication, the terms "publish, propagate, or 
advocate" are used. The demonstration of a clear intention to promote 
hatred is required, as well as a likelihood that harm will follow. Incitement to 
harm is not required. 
Botha and Govindjee contend that a restriction of freedom of expression in 
these terms is a reasonable and justifiable limitation to the freedom of 
expression and is rationally connected to the legislative purpose of 
addressing the marginalisation of vulnerable groups and of promoting a 
tolerant, pluralistic and egalitarian society. They do not relate their 
                                            
141  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ paras 4.6 and 5. 
142  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 28. 
143  See the discussion of this aspect in para 3.3. 
144  See Marais 2015 SAPL 475-476, where the author recommends the extension of 
the listed grounds in s 16(2)(c) of the Constitution in the context of the criminalisation 
of extreme hate speech. 
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recommendation as such to any sources and do not conduct a reasoned 
justification analysis in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.145 However, 
their proposal contains elements of both sections 319(1) and, in particular, 
319(2) of the Canadian Criminal Code146 and invites reference to the 
judgment in R v Keegstra. Section 319(1) prohibits incitement which is likely 
to lead to a breach of the peace, and section 309(2) prohibits the wilful 
promotion of hatred.147 In both instances offenders are liable to 
imprisonment.148 
The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Keegstra found section 319(2) not to 
be overly broad or vague. The reasoning was that its definitional limits 
ensure that it will capture only expressive activity which is openly hostile to 
the objective of preventing pain to the target group and reducing racial, 
ethnic, and religious tension and, perhaps, violence. The majority stated that 
Canada's international obligations and Charter sections 15149 and 27150 
emphasise the importance of this objective and concluded that the objective 
was of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a guaranteed right.151 
The Court took into account that the word "wilfully" restricts the reach of the 
section by requiring proof of either an intent to promote hatred or knowledge 
                                            
145  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 28 fns 121-124 are concerned with the absence of 
a "truth" defence. 
146  Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46 (the Canadian Criminal Code). 
147  Section 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code reads as follows: "(1) Every one who, 
by communicating statements in any public place, incites hatred against any 
identifiable group where such incitement is likely to lead to a breach of the peace is 
guilty of (a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding two years; or (b) an offence punishable on summary conviction. (2) Every 
one who, by communicating statements, other than in private conversation, wilfully 
promotes hatred against any identifiable group is guilty of (a) an indictable offence 
and is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years; or (b) an offence 
punishable on summary conviction." 
148  The main difference is that s 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code requires direct 
intent, while the recommended amendment requires a reasonable inference that the 
required intention is present. This difference does not refute our general argument. 
It is also difficult in any case to envisage that the promotion of hatred by means of 
publication, propagation, or advocacy of expression (sic) in public against an 
identifiable group of persons on one or more of the prohibited grounds which is likely 
to cause harm can be unintentional. 
149  Section 15(1) provides as follows: "Every individual is equal before and under the 
law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without 
discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or 
ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability." Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Constitution Act 1982 c 11 (the Canadian Charter) 
Schedule B. 
150  Section 27 of the Canadian Charter provides as follows: "This Charter shall be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and enhancement of the 
multicultural heritage of Canadians." 
151  R v Keegstra 1990 3 SCR 697 para VII.C. (iv). 
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of the substantial certainty of such a consequence. The word "hatred" 
further reduces the scope of the prohibition. This word, in the context of the 
section, must be construed as encompassing only the most severe and 
deeply felt form of opprobrium. Further, the exclusion of private 
communications from the scope of the section, the need for the promotion 
of hatred to focus upon an identifiable group, and the presence of the 
section 319(3) defences,152 which clarify the scope of section 319(2), all 
support the view that the impugned section creates a narrowly confined 
offence.153 
It falls outside the scope of our original contribution as well as of this 
response to formulate a detailed comparative analysis of Botha and 
Govindjee's proposal and, in particular, section 319(2) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code. It suffices to point to the resemblance to the proposed 
recommendation and the outcome of the proportionality analysis performed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada. Clearly, considering the reasoning of the 
Supreme Court of Canada, not only the prohibition but the criminalisation of 
the expression contemplated by the recommended prohibition can arguably 
be substantiated, subject to the explicit inclusion of a direct intention 
requirement. 
Our point is that this does not entail that section 10(1) is unconstitutional. 
Section 10(1) does not create a criminal offence to protect society against 
the harmful effects of the extreme forms of hate speech described in section 
319 of the Canadian Criminal Code or the proposed amendment. (Section 
10(2) makes provision for hate speech that constitutes a criminal offence to 
be referred for prosecution in terms of section 21(2) of the Act.)154 Section 
10(1) is rather primarily aimed at compliance with the constitutional 
obligation in terms of sections 9(3) and (4) of the Constitution, as well as 
international obligations, to protect and promote human dignity and equality. 
                                            
152  Section 319(3) of the Canadian Criminal Code provides as follows: "No person shall 
be convicted of an offence under subsection (2)[:] (a) if he establishes that the 
statements communicated were true; (b) if, in good faith, the person expressed or 
attempted to establish by an argument an opinion on a religious subject or an opinion 
based on a belief in a religious text; (c) if the statements were relevant to any subject 
of public interest, the discussion of which was for the public benefit, and if on 
reasonable grounds he believed them to be true; or (d) if, in good faith, he intended 
to point out, for the purpose of removal, matters producing or tending to produce 
feelings of hatred toward an identifiable group in Canada." 
153  R v Keegstra 1990 3 SCR 697 para VII.D (iii) a. 
154  See Marais 2015 SAPL 467-472. See South African Human Rights Commission v 
Khumalo 2019 1 SA 289 (GJ) para 113, where it was stated that the threshold for 
exercising the discretionary power envisaged in s 21(2)(n) of the Equality Act is that 
a crime "might have been committed". 
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We reiterate that it should be understood in the light of the commitment in 
the preamble of the Equality Act to "facilitate the transition to a democratic 
society, united in its diversity, marked by human relations that are caring 
and compassionate, and guided by the principles of equality, fairness, 
equity, social progress, justice, human dignity and freedom".155 In a 
comparative analysis it would be more appropriate to draw from and 
compare section 10(1) of the Equality Act to provisions in various human 
rights codes of Canadian provinces than to criminal offences in terms of 
section 319 of the Canadian Criminal Code156 (hence our references to the 
Whatcott case).157 
We agree that the ambit of section 10(1) is broader than that of section 
16(2)(c) of the Constitution. It is also broader than the scope of the proposed 
amendment. In our view, this is lawfully so. Our concern is that the aspects 
that Botha and Govindjee propose should be removed from the scope of 
section 10158 were purposely designed to address the very forms of "less 
serious" hate speech that they call attention to when they make the following 
statement:159 
States parties are also urged to make a clear distinction between expression 
which should attract a criminal sanction and expression which merely justifies 
a discriminatory remedy. For criminal liability it is emphasised that the speaker 
must intend to incite harm against the target group…According to CERD, 
however, less serious cases should be addressed by means other than 
criminal law, and here the impact of the speech on targeted groups is critical. 
Section 9(4) of the Constitution requires legislation to prevent and prohibit 
unfair discrimination. In our view the relevant question is whether section 
10(1) of the Act gives effect to this obligation without unduly infringing upon 
                                            
155  See para 2. 
156  See British Columbia Human Rights Code RSBC 1996 c 210. Also see s 3 of the 
Alberta Human Rights Act RSA 2000 c A-25.5 and s 14(1) of the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Code 1979 Ch S-24.1. To quote but one example, s 7 of the British 
Columbia Human Rights Code reads as follows: "(1) A person must not publish, 
issue or display, or cause to be published, issued or displayed, any statement, 
publication, notice, sign, symbol, emblem or other representation that (a) indicates 
discrimination or an intention to discriminate against a person or a group or class of 
persons, or (b) is likely to expose a person or a group or class of persons to hatred 
or contempt because of the race, colour, ancestry, place of origin, religion, marital 
status, family status, physical or mental disability, sex, sexual orientation, gender 
identity or expression, or age of that person or that group or class of persons. (2) 
Subsection (1) does not apply to a private communication, a communication 
intended to be private or a communication related to an activity otherwise permitted 
by this Code." 
157  See para 3.3.1. 
158  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ para 3.3. 
159  Botha and Govindjee 2017 PELJ 15. 
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the right to freedom of expression. By restricting section 10 to cover hate 
speech that warrants criminalisation, Botha and Govindjee negate this 
obligation. 
5 Conclusion 
We reconsidered and reaffirmed the premise of our understanding and 
analysis of section 10(1) of the Equality Act, that the expression that it 
prohibits unjustifiably affects the human dignity of those targeted related to 
their group identity, thus constituting a form of unfair discrimination. We 
reiterated that the most appropriate constitutional framework within which 
section 10(1) of the Equality Act should be interpreted and assessed is 
sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution. Subject to our recommended 
purposive reading or amendment of the first phrase of section 10(1), which 
we regard as poorly formulated,160 we confirmed the viability and 
constitutional soundness of the purposive interpretation of section 10(1) that 
we have offered. We criticised Botha and Govindjees' proposal on the basis 
that it negates the Act's primary aim, which is to give effect to the obligation 
in section 9(4) to prevent and prohibit unfair discrimination. Overall, having 
carefully considered the arguments raised by Botha and Govindjee, we 
maintain our view that section 10, subject to the said amendment or 
interpretation, duly limits the right to freedom of expression in giving effect 
to the obligation in section 9(4) of the Constitution to prevent and prohibit 
unfair discrimination. 
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